Simply consider the two extremely opposed possible research results: on the one hand, it could have conceivably turned out that humans and chimpanzees were totally dissimilar in their molecular structures; on the other hand, it could have been found—as it was—that humans and chimps are practically identical in those structures. Indeed, in the molecules so far compared, the identity has been found to be over 99 percent. Had the former situation been found, it would have constituted a falsification of the postulated close evolutionary relationship between humans and chimpanzees.
Were there to be similar discoveries throughout the whole range of postulated evolutionary relationships, this would constitute a severe, perhaps even fatal, blow to the entire evolutionary edifice. In point of fact, as now has been well established, the findings of such molecular comparisons have provided overwhelming support for the evolutionary relationships postulated initially on the basis of comparative anatomy.
Now consider the alternative responses of "scientific" creationists to these same two possibly opposing research findings. Had the molecular researchers found that human and chimpanzee DNA and protein structures were totally dissimilar, the "scientific" creationists would not have been able to contain themselves.
They would have been shouting from the rooftops that this was "proof" positive of the validity of "scientific" creationism—that this finding revealed clear evidence of the creator's intention to keep distinct the "created kinds. Now, we may safely anticipate that "scientific" creationists will be arguing that this finding, too, is just as their "model" would have predicted, that what we have here is clear evidence of the creator's grand common design.
Heads I win; tails you lose. Now, it can be appreciated why "scientific" creationists, in setting up their debates around the world, are so fond of framing those debates around some variation on the question: "Does evolution or creation provide a better explanation of the scientific evidence?
Thus, in one recent presentation of the creationist position, we are informed of the "fact" that "the Creation Model fits the real facts of science at least as well as the Evolution Model" Morris and Parker, , xiv; emphasis added. Note, incidentally, the word magic implicit in the use of the qualifier real to imply that any "facts of science" which either do not support creationism or which do support evolution are not "real" scientific facts—the qualifier real is the functional equivalent of true in the writings of fundamentalist "scientific" creationists.
Thus, "scientific" creationists consistently argue that creationism provides a better explanation than does the theory of evolution. And in this, they are in a very limited sense absolutely correct. Given an omnipotent supernatural creator, virtually anything can be "explained" as a result of that creator's actions and desires. The problem is, of course, that such an "explanation" is not a scientific one, and it is totally dishonest to imply that it is by framing the question at issue in terms of "scientific facts.
Considerations such as these are almost totally ignored in the writings of "scientific" creationists. Indeed, in one of those unintended ironies with which that literature abounds, Sir Karl Popper is actually cited as a scientific authority who is opposed to the theory of evolution.
He was never, of course, a "scientific" creationist; he simply once had some reservations about various aspects of general evolutionary theory. Today, Popper is a full-blown evolutionist, a point conveniently and consistently ignored by those "scientific" creationists who cite his earlier statements.
They identify it in their bibliography as Objective Knowledge when in fact the full title is Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach Also conveniently ignored is the fact that, in this very same book, Popper explicitly rejects his earlier criticisms and frames his description of the nature of science in evolutionary language. He speaks, for example, of competing theories in terms of the survival of the fittest.
Unlike legitimate scientists, as Popper conceives of them, "scientific" creationists have a highly developed talent for ignoring and even denying any facts that contradict their preconceptions. Wysong, for example, pays lip service to Popper's criterion of falsifiability , p. Lip service having been paid, this is the last we hear of the concept of falsifiability in the remaining pages of his book! Yet, it cannot be denied that "scientific" creationists are enamored of at least the form, if not the substance, of science.
One cannot escape the suspicion that if the fundamentalists who provide the overwhelming majority of "scientific" creationists were to adopt a clerical garb it would consist of a lab coat emblazoned with a cross.
At the same time, they are obviously committed to a set of religious dogmas that bring them into direct conflict with one of the most widely accepted theories in all of science: the theory of evolution. Thus, they find themselves in a perpetual double bind. And their attempts to resolve this double bind take the form of an effort to redefine "true" science in such a manner that it no longer conflicts with their cherished fundamentalist dogmas. As a result, they have developed their own little "folk conception" of science, one that is totally subservient to their preconceived fundamentalist theology.
Folk conception is a term used by cultural anthropologists to refer to the set of ideas that the people in a particular culture or subculture have about some area of reality. For example, people in different cultures have different folk conceptions of the law, of the proper form of family, of morality, and so forth. However, the folk conception of "true" science developed by "scientific" creationists has about as much resemblance to legitimate science as does astrology to astronomy or witchcraft to medicine.
To a great extent it is simply and simplistically an extended exercise in two old debater's tactics: begging the question that is, seeking to define the point at issue in such a manner so as to win the debate by definition and the strawman argument that is, misdefining your opponent's position in such a way as to guarantee its easy destruction combined with liberal doses of word magic.
Word magic is a typical feature of primitive closed thought systems in which it is commonly believed that words have the power to create or affect the things for which they stand see, Horton, In coming up with their definitions of "true" science, "scientific" creationists virtually never rely upon the writings of philosophers of science.
At best, their definitions began as unjustified extrapolations from dictionary definitions, usually combined with out-of-context quotes gleaned from the writings of evolutionary scientists see, for example, Gish, , p 2; and, for particularly simple-minded definitions of science and the scientific method, Wysong, , pp.
One omnipresent characteristic of "scientific" creationists' folk definitions of science is the contention that "true" science cannot address itself to the explanation of any event that occurred before there were any scientists present to observe it see, for example, Morris et al. One can see the obvious fundamentalist theological motivations that underlie this particular begging of the question.
In one fell swoop, by definition, evolutionary studies, historical geology, and much of astronomy are automatically excluded from the domain of legitimate science. Before dealing with the shortcomings of this particular attempt to restrict the range of science, it is most significant to note that this tactical maneuver also automatically excludes "scientific" creationism from the realm of "true" science.
Surprisingly, in an uncharacteristic display of honesty and humility, this is frequently openly conceded by "scientific" creationists themselves. But, this is really a form of copping a plea to a lesser offense as well as being a kind of diversionary tactic. By pretending that they are guilty of some kind of alleged scientific misdemeanor—that is, dealing with events that occurred prior to the existence of scientific witnesses—the "scientific" creationists draw attention away from their actual scientific felony: the utilization of a completely unfalsifiable appeal to the supernatural.
Moreover, as we shall see, the alleged misdemeanor to which they so graciously plead guilty turns out on analysis to be no scientific crime at all.
Finally, and here we see the schizophrenic element manifesting itself, this admission of a completely nonscientific status for "scientific" creationism is conveniently forgotten in their persistent use of the term scientific creationism in their articles, books, and, indeed, in the very name by which they identify themselves. The contention that "true" science cannot deal with phenomena that occurred before any scientists were present to observe them is based upon two unvoiced and demonstrably false presuppositions.
The first and more general false supposition is that science deals only with that which is directly observable—that is, the empirical world. At best, this is only a half-truth even this is generous—it would probably be more legitimately characterized as an eighth-truth.
Science constantly postulates the existence of theoretical forces and entities that are not directly observable. No one has ever actually seen an atom. No one has ever directly observed either electricity or gravity. To even suggest that science cannot deal with unobservables is to display an ignorance of the nature of the scientific enterprise. This is not to say that such unobservables have no relationship to that which can be observed. The legitimacy of postulated theoretical forces and entities is constantly being tested against the observable world.
Such testing constitutes a way of attempting to falsify the postulated theoretical entities and forces. Such testing, so crucial to any legitimate science, is, as we have seen, impossible with respect to the omnipotent supernatural being that constitutes the central "theoretical" entity in "scientific" creationism.
Indeed, if we once again turn to the writings that provide the ultimate motivation for "scientific" creationism, we are explicitly told, "Thou shall not test the Lord, thy God. The second false presupposition that underlies the creationists' restriction against "true" science saying anything about events that occurred prior to the existence of scientific witnesses is the apparent presumption that such postulated past events will have left no record of their occurrence, no evidence by which theories about that alleged occurrence can be tested.
This is analogous to arguing that, because there were no actual witnesses, we can never "truly" scientifically know if the bear actually did defecate in the woods—this despite the presence of a steaming pile of bear fecal material and numerous bear footprints. Likewise, we would have to deny, in spite of the superabundant fossil evidence, "true" scientific legitimacy to the claim that vast numbers of new extinct species once roamed the earth, simply because there were no scientists present to directly observe them.
When confronted with such criticisms of their theologically motivated folk conception of science, "scientific" creationists commonly resort to another tactic popular among debaters: equivocation.
This is the practice of switching definitions of a key word or concept in mid-argument. Margaret Defeyter is director of business and employer engagement at Northumbria University, a role which has given her a lot of hands-on experience with public communication. The best way I have found is through events such as the British Science Festival. The Healthy Living team ran a pop-up stand displaying hands-on models and activities based on research findings.
This worked extremely well, as it took something quite abstract and made it concrete. Rather than just trying to stamp out misunderstandings, we need to offer people something else to believe in.
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Sian Townson. Scientists have a duty to call out dubious research, says Sian Townson. Photograph: Alamy. Eight things you think are true — but science scoffs at.
For example, maximum temperature gradually increases from winter to summer trend , but from day-to-day it fluctuates up and down noise. We can model the trend with time using a relatively simple function such as a sine curve , but with more complex functions like high order polynomials we can reproduce the fluctuations too. This improvement is largely illusory though, as we are fitting to fluctuations that vary from year to year.
Perhaps the aesthetic appeal of a model following all data is too great. Pseudoscience embraces over-fitting in a myriad of ways. Overly complex functions including artificial neural networks , with no basis in physics, are often fitted to data without caution.
Data may be shifted, rejected or filtered without justification. Time and time again , climate change deniers claimed long-term warming will soon be replaced by exceptionally rapid cooling. Such claims did not come to pass , and current claims promoted by chairman of the Business Advisory Council Maurice Newman , among others are just as dubious.
Collaboration is a powerful tool for science, enabling scientists to branch into new disciplines, exchange expertise and reduce errors. Collaboration is also a powerful weapon against pseudoscience. An oceanographer knows the strengths and weaknesses of tide gauge measurements. The flaws of pseudoscience can thrive in the absence of collaboration.
The absence of collaboration by Ian Plimer may be part of a broader pattern. Studies rejecting anthropogenic climate change have an average of 2. Those who reject climate change collaborate less than other scientists, which can increase the likelihood of errors. Unfortunately students may have limited experience of collaboration. It is rare for students to create new groups with diverse skills from scratch. Marking schemes that evaluate performance relative to peers may even actively discourage collaboration and sharing of expertise by students.
It may discourage the skills students actually need to succeed in science. We need to make science education more like science itself, and this has been recognised by many science teachers. Students need the time to explore and test multiple plausible hypotheses.
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